

VOX POP Newsletter of Political Organizations and Parties

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THE NATIONALIZATION OF STATE POLITICS: THE 1994 ELECTION, THE RNC AND STATE POLITICS

Thomas H. Little, University of Texas at Arlington

On September 27, 1994 over three hundred Republican candidates for the United States House of Representatives stood on the steps of the United States Capitol and pledged to support the ten proposals that comprised the "Contract with America." Copies of the document were published in the *TV Guide* and the *Reader's Digest*, as well as hundreds of newspapers and magazines across the country. It was discussed and debated by academics, journalists, and politicians alike. The "Republican Contract with America" opened to great fanfare in the fall of 1994. However, this was not the only electoral contract of the 1994 election. Indeed, all across the country in the weeks following the signing in the nation's capitol, state and local candidates ventured to their statehouses to sign their own electoral promises.

Republican candidates for statewide and legislative offices in twenty states developed and publicly promoted contract-like documents in the month prior to the 1994 election. In sixteen states, party leaders developed a document that generally mirrored the national document in style and focus. Further, they held public events to promote the document similar to the national event noted above. In four other states, leaders used signing days to promote documents that were developed prior to the development and promotion of the national contract. In each of these twenty states, Republican candidates and officeholders turned out in great numbers to affix their name to a document outlining general principles or specific policy proposals to which they were committed.

Coordinating Elections Across the Country

The scope of this movement was no accident. In fact, it was all part of a strategy devised by Congressman Newt Gingrich and supported by other Republican members of Congress, GOPAC, the American Legislative Exchange Counsel, Republican National Committee Chairman Haley Barbour and other members of the RNC staff. Under its Special Projects Division, the RNC

housed the "Contract with America" organization charged with encouraging state and local parties to develop and promote their own contracts. With former Delaware Governor Pete DuPont at the helm, several RNC staff members provided direction, guidance and encouragement to state party and legislative officials in order to achieve the national coordination noted above. Initially, GOPAC distributed audio tapes to over 18,000 Republican officials across the nation with words of encouragement from Newt Gingrich, Dick Armey and Pete DuPont and strategic advice from Haley Barbour. Then all Republican state party leaders and legislative leaders received a packet of written information outlining basic Republican values as well as suggestions about how to coordinate, write and promote a contract. Finally, staff members in the RNC were in constant contact with state party leaders providing advice, support, direction, encouragement and suggestions.

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Influencing the Electoral Agendas

The objective of the party was not only to get states to adopt contracts, but to encourage them to adopt contracts that reflected common themes. Figure 1, which shows the distribution of the issues included in the twenty state contracts, gives evidence of their influence on the campaign agendas. Seven of the ten most common items, with the exceptions of education reform, controlling government waste and health reform, reflect items in the national document. Republicans in all twenty states promised to control or cut taxes. In fact, contracts in New York and New Hampshire were comprised completely of promises to support the Republican governor in cutting taxes. Candidates in seventeen states pledged to do something about crime while almost as many (sixteen) pledged to reform the welfare system. The fourteen contracts that mentioned education reform generally focused on decentralizing state control, a basic Republican value. A glance at the issues adopted in the states makes it clear that this was indeed a coordinated effort. The contracts quite accurately reflected the themes promoted by the RNC (accountability, responsibility and opportunity) as they encouraged the development of the documents. To a great extent, the vision of Haley Barbour to make the election of 1994 about "defining, building and communicating what our party stands for," came true in the contracts that spread across the electoral landscape.

Influencing the Electoral Outcomes

While the Republicans may have hoped to influence the issues on which the elections were contested, a necessary objective was to influence the elections. In order to govern, one must be elected to govern. It should be noted that Republicans did well in almost all states in 1994. In addition to making significant gains in the United States House and Senate, Republicans picked up eleven governor's positions, 106 seats in upper chambers and 354 lower chamber seats. They became the new senate majority party in six states and took control of eleven house chambers to give them a majority in more legislative chambers than at any time in the last fifty years.

The gains were not evenly distributed across the nation. Republicans did significantly better in the twenty states in which they promoted electoral contracts than in states void of such activities. In contract states, the average Republican gain was almost 13 (12.85) seats, while it was just under eight (7.673) in states where Republicans failed to publicize a contract. Likewise, senate gains were almost twice as high (3.899 seats to 1.967 seats) in states which had public electoral contracts. Even controlling for variables generally associated with seat gain by the party opposite that of the president, Republicans gained significantly more House and Senate seats in states in which they had contracts than in states where they did not. Having a public contract means an upper chamber gain of over two seats (2.23), regardless of variations in Clinton's popularity, the party of the governor or the legislative majority, the state of the economy, variations in voter drop off, financial efforts of the national party or Republican gains or losses in the 1992 election. In a similar manner, the presence of a contract was associated with a Republican gain of over seven seats (7.21) in lower chambers, regardless of the variables noted above. Clearly, the presence of a contract was associated with significant electoral gains in these state legislatures.

The Issues and the Election

The degree to which the particular issues in the contracts influenced the election are not clear. Given that voters generally have a very low level of knowledge concerning state and local elec-

tions, the election results probably do not reflect a thorough knowledge of the issues contained within a given state's contract.


Interviews with candidates and party leaders suggest two processes by which the contracts may have improved the fortune of Republican candidates. First, it was probably a tremendous asset for challengers who are always in need of a message and recognition. The contract provided them with both. According to one state party leader, "When a person on the campaign trail asked them (challengers) what distinguished them from their opponent, they had a ready answer to respond with... we printed up hand sized contracts almost like a checklist that they could hand out when people asked what the party stood for." Second, it may be that the voters were responding more to the willingness of the politicians to affix their name to a binding document rather than to the particular issues within that document. Reflecting on the election after the completion of a successful legislative session, a Southern Republican discussed the importance of the contract in his state, "We did what we said we were going to do. It has given us instant credibility. You can't help but be impressed with a group that said they were going to do this when they got elected, and by God they did it!"

The Future of Campaigning and Governing by Contract

By any account, the 1994 efforts of the national Republican party to influence the issues and the results of the 1994 election at the state level was a success. Almost half of the states holding state legislative elections in 1994 adopted and promoted issue positions that reflected the values and strategies adopted by the national party. They wrote contracts, held public signings and distributed information to the media as suggested by the national party. They wrote contracts, held public signings and distributed information to the media as suggested by the national party. Further, Republican party leaders who took the advice of the national party leaders to develop and promote a contract found themselves much more successful than their colleagues who, for whatever reason, failed to heed the advice.

Does this success portend a trend toward more issue based campaigns and greater party centralization? The answer to that may lie in the 1996 campaigns. While there appears to be little interest among the Republicans of replicating the national document in 1996, Democrats have discussed developing such a pledge and several state Republican and Democratic parties have expressed interest in producing (or revising) an electoral document. The success of the 1994 effort may alter the way parties involve themselves in elections and therefore must alter the way that we as scholars study them.

Figure 1: Contracts in the States
The Electoral Agendas



FROM HEADQUARTERS

Executive Council Meeting at Midwest April 19, 1996

POP Chairman John Bibby, Secretary-Treasurer Diana Dwyre and Executive Council members Barbara Burrell, Paul Herrnson and Andrew McFarland met at the Midwest Political Science Association convention in Chicago on April 19, 1996. The following transpired.

1. Burdette Loomis has been appointed program chair for the 1997 APSA meeting.
2. John Bibby reported that Council members have expressed enthusiastic support for a POP/APSA sponsored special program marking the 50th Anniversary of the APSA Report, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System." He will contact Sheila Mann at APSA to move forward with this project.
3. Update on POP journal
The Council members present discussed various options for

a POP-sponsored journal and the report of the electronic journal committee chaired by Sandy Maisel. Both the potential of such an undertaking and the problems that will have to be resolved before a quality electronic journal can be produced were discussed. It was agreed that journal issues and options would be considered at the fall business meeting and executive council meeting.

4. Upcoming meetings at APSA 1996 — San Francisco
Annual business meeting and awards ceremony, Friday August 30, 1996, 12:30 p.m. San Francisco Crowne Plaza Parc 50-5, Corintin Room

POP Executive Council Meeting, Friday, August 30, 1996, 1:30 p.m. immediately following business/awards meeting.

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1996 POP AWARDS

Herbert E. Alexander, winner of the Samuel Eldersveld Award for a lifetime of distinguished scholarly and professional contributions to the field.

E. E. Schattschneider, winner of the Leon Epstein Award for a book that has made a distinguished contribution to the field for *The Semi-Sovereign People*.

V.O. Key, Jr., winner of the Jack Walker Award for an article of unusual importance and significance to the field for "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, 17 (February 1955):3-18.

Anthony Corrado, winner of the Emerging Scholars Award.

While the Epstein and Walker awards are being awarded posthumously, the committee believed that it was essential that POP acknowledge the contributions made by these pioneering parties specialists and for these works in particular which have had a continuing impact upon our field.

Nominations

Report of Nomination Committee:

The nominating committee offers the following recommendations for POP officers:

Secretary-Treasurer:

Diana Dwyre, University of Maryland
Baltimore County

Council Members

John S. Jackson, III, Southern Illinois University
Ruth S. Jones, Arizona State University
Candice J. Nelson, American University
Daniel S. Ward, Rice University

Jerome M. Mileur, Chair

FROM THE FIELD

Parliamentary Documents Center for Central Europe

The new Parliamentary Documents Center for Central Europe will collect essential documents from the new democratic parliaments of Central Europe.

A joint project of University of North Carolina at Greensboro and East Carolina University, the Center will collect initially two types of working parliamentary documents: Membership Directories and Sessional Summary Reports. We will include the first democratic decade of Central Europe, beginning with the parliaments initially elected in the 1989-91 period.

Parliamentary documents will be available to interested scholars, students, and others. Internet connections will make the collection available throughout the world, and requests for materials via fax, photocopying and personal visits are welcome.

Persons who wish to provide or use documents, or who have suggestions for parliamentary and democratization research, are invited to contact the project directors:

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Conference

"We Get What We Vote For... Or Do We?"

*A Conference on the impact of elections on governing:
A dialogue between academic and political professionals*

October 25 and 26, 1996

Political Science Department
SUNY College at Oneonta, New York 13820

Democracies operate on an assumption that elections not only choose government leaders, but that they set policy directions for the society. Yet anyone who studies politics and government understands that this relationship is far from perfect.

This conference, on the eve of America's 53rd presidential election, will provide an opportunity for political scientists, political historians, and political professionals (elected and non), to present papers and exchange views about the impact of presidential, congressional, gubernatorial, and state legislative elections on American government, national and state. The conference will examine both the general impact of elections on governing, but also the effect of more specific aspects of elections, such as:

- voter turnout: who votes, who doesn't, so what?
- campaign finance: what policies do donors get for their money?
- political parties, including third parties;
- political interest groups, including PACs, and their endorsement of candidates;
- nominations and the nomination process;
- the media, including TV, print, news and commentary, now the Web;
- the electoral college.

Not incidentally, the conference will also offer a chance to explore the concept of political leadership, and the nature of representation.

The conference will organize these topics into the following (tentative) panels of presenters:

Panel 1: The Policy Impact of Voter Turnout and Non-voting

Panel 2: The Policy Impact of Election Participation by Political Interest Groups and PACS

Panel 3: The Policy Impact of Campaign Finance

Panel 4: The Policy Impact of Political Parties, Platforms, and The Nomination Process

Panel 5: The Policy Impact of media Coverage of Elections

Panel 6: A General Panel: The Impact of Elections on Government and Policy

In addition to the six panels, the conference will include addresses by two noted speakers, drawn from a list of nationally known political leaders and political scientists.

It is also our intention to have at least one political professional on each of the panels to expand the range of dialogue at the conference.

For further information contact Dr. Paul E. Scheele, Political Science Department, SUNY Oneonta, Oneonta, New York 13820.

POP-APSA 1996 Workshop — The Role of Third Parties in American Politics

Wednesday, August 28, 1996 — APSA — San Francisco, California

Morning Session

9:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m., Mason Room, San Francisco Hilton

Ruth Jones, Arizona State University, Chair

Paul Herrinson, University of Maryland

"Why the U.S. Does Not Have a Multi-Party System"

Kay Lawson, San Francisco State University

"The Case for a Multi-Party System"

John Bibby, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

"In Defense of the Two-Party System"

Christian Collett, University of California

"Minor Party Candidates in Subpresidential Elections:
Backgrounds, Beliefs, and Political Activities"

Bob Harmel, Texas A&M University

"Lessons about New Parties from Multi-Party Systems Abroad"

Robin Kolodny, Temple University, Discussant

Afternoon Session

2:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m., Lombard Room, San Francisco Hilton

Diana Dwyre, University of Maryland Baltimore County, Chair

Richard Winger, Ballot Access News

"Institutional Obstacles to Third Parties"

Terry Savage, California Libertarian Party

"The Goals and Strategies of the Reform Party"

Justin Roberts, Board of Directors, Reform Party of California

"The Goals and Strategies of the Reform Party"

Greg Jan, Green Party of California

"The Goals and Strategies the Green Party"

John Green, Bliss Institute of Applied Politics, University of Akron,
Discussant

SCHOLARLY PRECINCTS

Harry Truman and the Democratic Party

Sean Savage, Saint Mary's College

Table of Contents

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Chapter 5: Maintaining the Majority Party: 1948
Chapter 6: The Fair Deal and the Democratic Party
Chapter 7: Democratic Dissensus, 1950-1952
Epilogue: Truman's Legacy in the Democratic Party

Truman: The Party Leader

This will be the first book on Harry S. Truman that exclusively and comprehensively devotes its content and purpose to a detailed analysis of Truman's relationship with the Democratic party and his presidential behavior as a party leader. In particular, this will be the first book on Truman that will contain separate chapters on the Democratic National Committee during his presidency, Truman's relationships with machine bosses, and on Democratic dissensus, an original concept introduced by the author. In these chapters, as in others, a certain richness and originality are expressed due to the use of personal interviews with former Truman administration and DNC officials by the author as well as neglected archives from the Truman Library, Library of Congress, Joseph W. Martin, Jr. Institute, and the University of Kentucky library.

The theme of the book is that Truman's approach to and behavior as party leader reflected the internal conflicts that he experienced in his own relationship with the Democratic party and in his goals for the party. These internal conflicts partially resulted from the fact that Truman was both a party regular and a liberal reformer. As a party regular, Truman overemphasized the importance of unconditional party loyalty to Democratic allies and subordinates and did little to coopt liberal Republicans and independents into the Democratic party or cultivate a significant liberal Republican bloc of supporters for his domestic policy agenda, as FDR had done.

Likewise, Truman as a party regular initially behaved passively and even complacently to the growing evidence of corruption by administration officials and criticized the Kefauver committee hearings' public disclosures of collusion between gangsters and Democratic machines for weakening the Democratic party elec-

torally in the 1950 and 1952 elections. As a regular Democrat, Truman sought internal harmony and cooperation within his party's apparatus, especially by ensuring that White House aides did not usurp the Democratic national chairman's authority and responsibilities, as had happened under Roosevelt. Likewise, he wanted a more harmonious, deferential relationship with leading Democrats in Congress that FDR had.

Despite Truman's desire for a more internally cohesive, smoothly functioning Democratic party, he experienced significant intra party discord. To a certain extent, this discord resulted from the second and equally influential quality of Truman's party leadership and political behavior, i.e., his status as a liberal reformer. Influenced by agrarian populism, Wilsonian progressivism, and his record as a New Deal senator, Truman possessed a simple yet sincere liberal ideology that partially motivated him to pursue policy goals which often weakened and divided his party, especially among southern Democrats in Congress. Truman's 21-Point Program submitted to Congress in 1945 was a more detailed and extensive compilation of social welfare and economic reform proposals than FDR's 1944 Economic Bill of Rights was. In particular, Truman's advocacy of civil rights for blacks, the legal foundation for a desegregated military, a national health insurance proposal, federal aid to elementary and secondary education, and repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act are evidence of this belief in maintaining and further enhancing the Democratic party as a distinctly liberal party in its ideology and policy agenda.

This theme of Truman's vacillation, conflict, and occasional symbiosis between his two roles as a party regular and liberal reformer is evident throughout the book. Consequently, unlike biographies of Harry Truman and histories of his presidency, this book is arranged in topical, not chronological, order. For example, while the last chapter includes a section on the 1952 presidential campaign, various elements of the 1952 Democratic presidential campaign, such as the tactics of the DNC's apparatus and the role of Jacob Arvey, are addressed previously in the book. Throughout this book, Truman's political behavior in general and party leadership in particular are frequently assessed according to the criteria of ideology, coalition, and policy agenda as the major characteristics of a party. Hopefully, the content and structure of this analysis of Truman's party leadership will prove to be useful to both historians and political scientists.

The book will be available from the University Press of Kentucky in May, 1997.

SPECIAL INTERESTS

Representation in Crisis: Political Parties and the Constitution

David K. Ryden, Hope College

Few political scientists still harbor the illusion of the courts as insulated, apolitical institutions. Yet we frequently fail to grasp their powerful influence in determining the shape and operation of our politics at its most practical level. In particular, the U.S.

Supreme Court is the ultimate guardian of representative government, wielding a final check on actions exercised by the other more "political" branches of government. It is disturbing, therefore, that a close look at the laws of redistricting, campaign finance, ballot access, patronage, and other areas reveals a Court sorely lacking a coherent theory of representation to guide it. The Court has tended toward superficially appealing notions of group-based representation, while impoverishing the constitutional standing

Representation in Crisis: Political Parties and the Constitution *(continued)*

of political party structures. The net effect has been to feed the crisis of representation afflicting this country.

The American liberal tradition, while the principal feature of our political culture, may also be our greatest obstacle to realizing effective representation. The liberal emphasis on individualism is fundamental to our cultural and social institutions, and dominates our political thought and practice. It is reflected in an unflinching predisposition toward direct, unfettered forms of personal political participation. It has also been the central theme in constitutional jurisprudence, as the Supreme Court has traditionally understood representation as grounded in unchanneled personal political activity.

The corollary of this individualistic conception of politics is a fundamental distrust of political organizations. It is manifested in the popular perception of parties as nothing more than tools of gridlock and in the near-criminal status interest groups have acquired in most people's minds. Traces of this distrust can be detected on the Court, as it has invoked an abridged version of representation aimed at promoting greater individual participation and fairness, often at the expense of political organizations.

Democratic theory, however, suggests that effective representation is obtainable only through a more complex and multi-faceted path, leading through a labyrinth of theories, ideas, and behaviors. It fuses multiple concepts of representation, a variety of modes and practices that generate representation, and a host of political players acting in a representative capacity. This view of representation requires systematic institutional arrangements to reconcile its intricacies, complexities, and different dimensions. In short, representation transpires only through intermediate structures such as political parties and associations of a variety of stripes and colors.

The law of representation cannot ignore the pluralistic, group-constituted character of the American political landscape. Individual political efficacy in a large-scale democracy hinges on the collectivities that exist to represent one's interests. Individuals are empowered through vigorous group participation, their voices discernible when raised in concert with others who share their interests. The law must be cognizant of group forces and influences if the divergent goals of representative democracy are to be realized.

In the past fifteen years, the Court has attempted to do this, tempering its earlier preoccupation with individualistic, procedurally progressive politics with an infusion of group consciousness. Group-regarding jurisprudence surfaced with race-conscious rules of redistricting designed to enhance the representation of minorities (*Thornburg v. Gingles*). It was extended to partisan gerrymandering activities, in the articulation of a group right to "fair and effective representation" (*Davis v. Bandemer*). In campaign finance regulation, the Court embraced a full-scale program of group representation, legally assigning groups different rights based on their distinctive character, structure, purpose, and overall representative capacity (*FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life*; *Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce*). Following Congress's lead, the Court sought to equalize groups' influence by monitoring the money they could pump into campaigns.

In each case, the Court attacked the operational shortcomings of pluralism by conferring formal legal rights directly upon

certain groups. The pluralist ideal had been badly tarnished by glaring imperfections in group competition, wide disparities in group resources and influence, the private nature of group input, and the inherent democratic shortcomings of groups and associations. The consequence was a policy-making arena wrought with paralysis and fragmentation, and government administration characterized by interest group liberalism. The constitutional response was to elevate the legal status of disadvantaged groups, in hopes of a more level group playing field.

While well-intended, the Court's efforts to remedy group inequalities were badly flawed. First, its recognition of group rights was driven largely by political considerations rather than a theoretical understanding of institutionalized group structures and their representative character. The Court wound up dispensing "group representation" rights to isolated descriptive groups due to political pressure or necessity, without a basis for defining those rights or the premise upon which they could be assigned. The result was a potential morass, with the Court making political calculations beyond its capabilities and outside its authority.

Second, the focus on the rights of separate, discrete groups is only likely to divide and segment the polity, undermining the delicate tension between the paradoxical goals of representation. Reducing representation to rights means a rigid, inflexible legal hierarchy of winners and losers, and only subverts the ultimate goal of group compromise which is required by the pluralist ideal. Even more problematic are the empirical challenges of categorizing and ordering groups for purposes of parceling out special representative privilege. Gauging political resources to permit the legal rationing of influence presents insurmountable difficulties. Finally, group representation abandons the complex reality of representation in favor of a one-dimensional substitute consisting mostly of descriptive elements.

The preferable alternative, one anticipated by democratic theory and principles of representation, is the one the Court has shunned; namely, a party systems model based on constitutional recognition of party structures as channels of representation. In short, party organizations offer a comprehensive institutional response to the myriad of representational demands, operating in a representative capacity on multiple levels. They are instrumental in the selection of rulers via elections; they petition government in the realm of policy-making once the leaders have been chosen; they act as agents of governance to produce policy outputs responsive to people's preferences. By functioning in a multiplicity of roles, party systems serve essential democratic values of accountability and public control in nonpareil ways.

In contrast to the group-centered approach, party channels alleviate the contradictory demands of pluralism, facilitating both individual and group activity. They simultaneously constrain, direct, and empower all types of political actors. They aggregate and give expression to individual participation otherwise lost in the swirl and dissonance of mass democracy. They serve as forums for and vehicles of group influence, building their electoral success on coalitions of groups. While fostering diversity and amplifying the array of voices in the political arena, they also unify and coalesce, cultivating civic consciousness and enlightened perspectives among members. In the end, the unique institutional and structural

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Representation in Crisis: Political Parties and the Constitution *(continued)*

attributes of party organizations compel a party-informed constitutional jurisprudence.

Unfortunately, party structures have been the missing component in the Court's work. A survey of the cases reveals a consistent failure to acknowledge parties as integral tools of representative democratic politics. A common thread runs through the Court's rulings on electoral politics, be it a question of patronage, voter or ballot access, redistricting or gerrymandering, or campaign finance. Each reflects a dangerous indifference toward the institutional safeguards of representative democracy that reside in the form of political parties. The Court is prone to treating parties as functionally indistinguishable from, and sometimes even subordinate to, other political actors and associations.

This judicial disregard for parties has real and significant consequences. It is one more blow to those mediating organizations which are essential to seasoning the individualistic, rights-based side of liberalism with the reality of our pluralist, group-constituted society. It has magnified the inherent contradictions between the two, further atrophying those structures which serve our liberal heritage while also promoting some sense of unity and community which are the essential glue of our pluralist society.

The upshot of the legal neglect of party subsystems is to compromise basic democratic goals of accountability and control. Trading in party politics for some idyllic notion of unimpeded personal participatory politics slights those entities capable of aggregating and molding political behavior to achieve those values. It has left the public without effective means of directing their representatives to act or of removing them when they fail. In short, it has widened the disconnect between the governed and their governors.

The byproduct is a palpable disillusionment with politics, the environment of alienation, distrust and dissatisfaction that surrounds us. Despite the inexorable expansion of their political rights and opportunities, people perceive no corresponding increase in their political leverage. Indeed they see just the opposite, the marginalization of their influence in the face of domineering special interests and a less responsive government. Ironically, this disillusionment breeds an even greater desire for direct and unmediated involvement, as people blame the political institutions and actors for the current state of affairs. In this hostile political environment, parties provide convenient scapegoats for a restless electorate. Incumbents intent on keeping their offices are all too eager to impose additional legal restraints on parties to appease the hue and cry for reform. When those added shackles fail to produce a more effective government, the cycle of escalating skepticism and alienation only intensifies.

Yet all is not lost. New battlefields loom which will present opportunities to reconsider the importance of party organizations. For example, currently pending before the Court is a constitutional challenge to federal election rules limiting parties' involvement in funding campaigns (*FEC v. Colorado Republican Party*). The case confronts directly the parties' legal status, and a favorable decision could significantly elevate their prominence in campaigns. Redistricting issues will certainly remain in the forefront, as the Court grapples for some coherent theoretical framework to replace its abandonment of race-conscious redistricting practices and

descriptive representational goals. Questions involving party autonomy, the legal treatment of third parties and independent candidates, and even patronage practices will likely allow the Court to revisit the parties' role in representative government.

When it does, political scientists must stand ready to join the legal fray, and to lobby for a theoretical guide which will reconcile the variety of demands emanating from the maze of representation theory. The Court needs a reconstituted vision of representation. My prescription is simply to apply a traditional legal concept in a nontraditional way, by conceptualizing representation as a "conflict of interests." Unlike the negative connotation conflicts of interest have in the usual legal context, conflicts in the framework of representation are desired. The effectiveness of representation corresponds to the number of interests and influences brought to bear on representatives and representative institutions. The broader the range of interests voiced, the greater the conflicts, and the higher the caliber of representation. Only that legislator or assembly exposed to maximum conflicts will approach the paradigm of representation. The representative faced with a healthy conflict of interests will appreciate the array of interests to which she must respond, the variety of forms (individual and collective) in which they present themselves, and the set of representational modes at her disposal to satisfy them.

Envisioning representation in this way underscores the indispensability of the substructures of parties and associations. Without them, conflict is dampened and diffused. Through them, a greater number of interests speak, and with a clearer voice. Through both intra- and inter-party structures the conflicting interests are generated, compete, and are resolved. Similarly, defined structures within government in the form of majority and minority parties produce governance out of what would otherwise be a paralyzing set of conflicts. Simply put, representation theory requires democratic structures to first create conflicts of interest, and then somehow translate them into representative action. Party systems perform these tasks.

The goal is not to always produce pro-party outcomes. Rather, it is to craft constitutional principles with an eye toward the institutional criteria of representation, with an awareness of the unique functional value of parties in creating conflicts of interest and in shaping the political activity arising out of them into representation.

The organizational and institutional activities of parties are instrumental to our democracy's functioning. An adjustment in judicial attitudes would better equip (or free) parties to satisfy their primary theoretical justifications. Representation is ultimately about ensuring that the subjects have control over what their government does. This is not self-executing, nor is it realized through informal or haphazard means. Rather it "requires that there be machinery for the expression of the wishes of the represented" and for government to respond to those wishes. It behooves us as political scientists to be constantly reminding our legal comrades that it is party structures which provide this in a public and systematic way.

This essay is drawn from David K. Ryden's *Representation in Crisis: The Constitution, Interest Groups, and Political Parties* (State University of New York Press).

David K. Ryden is an associate professor of political science at Hope College.

APSA'S MEMBERSHIP DIRECTORY IS COMING!

Do you need to update your membership information?

In 1997 we will print the new Membership Directory from the information stored in our database as of November 15, 1996. It is up to you to make sure we have your most current data. What we maintain is reported to you annually on your Membership Renewal Form, which you update and return to us with your dues payment. *If you are a new member, if your information has changed, or if you want to add something new, please contact us with your changes by November 15, 1996.* There will be a form you can use for this purpose in the September 1996 PS and the Program for the 1996 Annual Meeting. In the meantime, you can reach us via any of the following methods:

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